5th. ARMD. DIV.

Maj.. Gen. Lunsford E. Oliver, C. G.
Lt. Col. John B. Rosenzweig, Bn. C. O.

AUGUST 6, 1944 - APRIL 26, 1945

The many hours and strenuous effort spent in three years of training
were proved on the battlefield beginning with our first "fire mission"
on 6 August 1944 to the final "on the way" 26th of April 1945. This was
our contribution to the campaign of Western Europe. We have emerged from
our combat experience wiser, more matured, and, I hope, stronger. We can
be proud of our many accomplishments.

The official records speak for themselves, but the records do not
include "the days and nights of constant fighting with little or no
rest; nor the nights spent in wet and cold fox holes and the maddening
night marches. On many occasions tempers and nerves were at the cracking
point, yet you never wavered and our missions were completed.

In humility and respect, we offer a prayer for our members who paid the
supreme sacrifice. We will not forget them. May God grant compassion to
their families and lessen their grief in the thought of deeds well done.

We shall carry on our future missions in the same manner, with the same
enthusiasm and ideals. I salute you as men, as artillerymen, and as
members of the "47th."
                                 - The Old Man.


On August 1, 1944, a few days after the St. Lo break through, while in
bivouac near St. Sauveur le Vicomte the 47th Armored Field Artillery
Battalion, with Battery "A", 387th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion
attached, was attached to Combat Command "A" for movement south from the
bivouac area. The Fifth Armored Division had been assigned to the XV
Corps and the next day wall given the mission of seizing Fougeres. Upon
attaining that objective, the battalion in support of CC "A" moved east
to Chateau Gontier, the location of a bridge vital to the continued
advance of the combat command.
The battalion went into a firing position
on the evening of August 6, approximately two and one half miles west of
the town.

When the advanced elements of the force attempted to cross the bridge,
they were fired upon by two self-propelled 88's and called upon the 47th
for support and to fire their first rounds in combat. At approximately
2200, "A" Battery reported to Lt. Brown, forward observer of the 47th
attached to the leading elements, that the first round was on the way-
In spite of the fact that the firing chart was a 1:200,000 Michelln road
map, the first rounds were close enough so that Lt. Brown achieved a
rapid adjustment in the growing darkness, quickly bringing in the
remainder of the battalion to neutralize the 88's and open the way for
unimpeded advance across the bridge. The 400th Armored Field Artillery
Battalion was assigned the mission of reinforcing the 47th, and joined
us on the morning of the 7th.

At that time large enemy forces had concentrated In and near the town of
Le Mans, and were attempting to withdraw to the east and northeast. To
prevent this escape, CC "A" moved east to Le Mans against scattered
resistance which was easily brushed aside. Going Into position outside
of Le Mans, Lts. Brown, Brett and Egan, the 47th's forward observers, In
conjunction with battalion fire direction center, on the spot and In a
short time, drew up a plan of prearranged "ladder" fires by battalion
concentration. This unique and unorthodox fire plan achieved brilliant
success as the enemy positions, many of them dug In and protected by
self-propelled and emplaced high velocity guns, were thoroughly raked by
battalion concentrations until they were neutralized.

The mission of the Combat:Command having been achieved In this action
and large forces of the enemy dispersed and broken up, the battalion
moved northward toward Argentan. Just beyond Ballon on the morning of
August 10 after a sharp clash in that town, intense artillery fire
suddenly fell on the battalion as it advanced. Battery "A's" column
received the bulk of this fire, and had two self-propelled 105
howitzer's knocked out before cover could be sought. With coolness under
fire, quick, sound, judgment, and prompt execution, Lts. Alexander and
Millett directed by Major Wilkie, the battalion Executive, dispersed our
vehicles and personnel. Immediately by-passing the danger area, the
battalion was reassembled and brought devastating fire to bear on the
hostile weapons resulting in their destruction. This mission, and many
others that day, was adjusted by our air observers who provided
invaluable assistance both in adjusting our own and in marking targets
for the XIX Tactical Air Corps who supported us in this drive. During
this day and the one following, the close support aircraft knocked out
25 hostile tanks.

            THE ARGENTAN GAP

At Argentan the southern jaw of the famous Falaise Gap was being formed,
an operation termed at that time by General Patton as being the greatest
single operation on the continent. As a part of General Patton's Third
Army, CC "A" was to hold the southern jaw of the pinchers and to contain
the enemy forces being squeezed between the Third Army on the south, and
the Canadians on the north. All the way from Le Mans to Argentan,
sporadic but ferocious resistance was met, including a plainly marked
German ambulance loaded with 55 troops who fired on our column with burp
guns, rifles and machine guns until a few rounds from the tanks
thoroughly liquidated them. Arriving in the vicinity of the town of
Argentan on the night of August 12, the battalion went Into an advanced
position. Reveille early on the morning of the 13th of August was the
scream of 88 shells passing over the battalion position from
self-propelled guns that had been moved up close to our advance tanks
during the night. To meet this unexpected and close-in attack, the 47th
and the 400th quickly placed fire on the enemy guns and knocked them

The Falaise Pocket enclosed the powerful remnants of an entire German
Army, and It was apparent from the start of the operation that the enemy
was determined to with. draw from the pocket at all costs. Many
counter-attacks were launched against our positions which were
unprotected by regular infantry. The ensuing action was in many respects
an artilleryman's dream. The escape roads used by the Germans were.under
our fire continuously. The enemy was desperate enough to use these roads
in daylight despite continuous air attacks and devastating artillery
fire. Together with the reinforcing 400th Armd F. A. Bn., the 47th
inflicted severe damage upon the enemy. Targets by the score were found
by the ground observation post and and by Cub observation planes.
Fighter bomber planes were in the skies continuously. When they ran out
of targets, they would circle until either our ground or air OP's began
adjusting on a target they had discovered, and then, much to the disgust
of the artillerymen, they would dive in and take over the target.

Among the known damage inflicted upon the enemy by our artillery, not
including the targets taken away from us by the Air Corps, were six Mark
V Panther tanks, several self-propelled guns, (Including those that
sounded reveille for us on the morning of the 13th) many AA guns and
uncounted miscellaneous combat and transport vehicles. Although a light
battalion not suited for such work, the 47th frequently was called upon
to do counterbattery work and neutralized at least one battery of enemy
160 millimeter guns.

                   TOWARD THE SEINE

Upon relief of the Division by the 90th Infantry Division, the 47th on
August 15th was attached to CC "R" to reinforce the fires of the 95th
Armored Field Artillery Battalion. The battalion moved east against
light opposition to the town of Dreux, an advance of surprising
proportions totalling nearly 80 miles. The capture of the town was the
Combat Command mission. On the 16th of August, the battalion went into
advanced position near Dreux to support the attack of CC "R" on the
town. Enemy resistance was stubborn and during the afternoon the
battalion was ordered to displace to the rear. Enemy counter battery
fire was received throughout the battalion position that afternoon. On
the 18th, the battalion was reattached to Combat Command "A" and
rejoined the command.

CC "A" then began a drive northward to the Seine River In the vicinity
of Louviers, with the 400th again assigned the mission of reinforcing
our fires. The advance was marked by frequent clashes with
strongly-resisting enemy, especially in the narrow corridor between the
Eure and Seine Rivers. On the morning of 20th August, CC "A" tangled
with a fiercely resisting enemy group, well supported by tanks and
self-propelled guns; again that morning reveille was the screech of high
velocity incoming mail. Indications of the character of enemy
encountered was seen early that morning when Boche tanks fired upon and
hit medical vehicles attempting to evacuate wounded from the
battlefield. In spite of the bitter defense staged by the enemy in his
attempt to hold a radio communications center, the fire of the 47th and
400th soon broke his will to fight and the advance proceeded to a
position near Douains.

Here a squadron of the 19th Tactical Air Force was assigned to the
Combat Command and with the assistance of the 47th and 400th, who marked
many targets for the "angels," twenty-five tanks were destroyed.

In this position, Battery "B" was fired upon from a farm house near the
Battery position. This was reported to the battalion CP, where Lt.
Brown, battalion forward observer, volunteered to take his tank and
investigate the source of fire. Together with Lt. Gallagher, Battery
"B," in his halftrack, Lt. Brown proceeded to the vicinity of the
farmhouse. When he had approached to within fifty feet of the building,
an SS trooper in a fox hole not five yards. from Lt. Brown's tank fired
a bazooka at the tank, scoring a hit that killed Lt. Brown and Sgt.
Fountouklis and wounded Cpl. Peck. Machine gun fire from the halftrack
accounted for the SS trooper. A task force consisting of two M-7's and
some halftracks from Battery "A," 387th AAA, proceeded to attack the
farm house. The combination of direct 105mm., 67mm., and 50 caliber
machine gun fire completely razed the structure which turned out to be a
strongly defended assembly point for retreating enemy troops. Casualties
among the Germans must have been heavy, as the buildings were crowded
with enemy soldiers retreating from Pacy, although the buildings burst
into flames too quickly to ascertain any accurate count.

Between the 18th of August and 23rd, the artillery claimed the score of
at least 35 tanks (these with assistance from the Air Corps), numerous
trucks and many anti-tank and self-propelled guns.

                                LIBERATING A CAPITOL

On the 24th of August, the Fifth Armored Division was assigned to the V
Corps of the First Army. The "big picture" was that the Division, with
the 47th in direct support of CC "A" would drive eastward through
France, Belgium and Luxembourg to the German border.

The Fifth Armored Division passed through Paris on the 30th of August,
shortly after the city had been liberated, receiving a memorable welcome
from thousands upon thousands of cheering, kissing, flag waving
civilians. The drive through France and Belgium was uneventful, light
opposition being encountered from the retreating enemy with occasional
sharp battles in narrow defiles.

Long marches, night and day, were frequent; one such march from Esnes to
Mesmont totalling 83 miles in less than 12 hours. As the advance
approached to within a few miles of the city of Luxembourg, however, it
became apparent that the enemy was using the city as an assembly point
for his retreating troops.
As leading elements of the Combat Command on September 10, neared the
town of Merle, Duchy of Luxembourg, 20 enemy tanks supported by a
garrison of several hundred infantry staged an aggressive defense. The
character of the enemy defense required the full use of all of the fire
power of the Combat Command, which consisted of two battalions of
armored light artillery (47th and 400th) and one battalion of 155mm
guns, self-propelled (987th). It soon was apparent from the skillful
tactics of the enemy, that the engagement was considerably more than a
hastily planned rear-guard action. Due largely to the heroic work of the
forward observers and Battery reconnaissance officers, all three
artillery battalions delivered crushing fire upon enemy infantry, tanks,
self-propelled guns and fortified positions. The engagement was further
marked by the brilliant use of fighter-bomber support, swift, aggressive
ground action and close cooperation among the artillery, tanks, infantry
and the "glamor boys" upstairs. Numerous armored and transport vehicles
were destroyed and large concentrations of enemy infantry were scattered
or killed.

The following day, September 11, the Combat Command moved through the
City of Luxembourg to liberate officially the capitol of the Grand
Duchy. The city itself had not been defended by the enemy because, as
they boasted, they expected to be back within a month.
Just east of the city, however, remnants of the same force encountered
at Merle again set up an extremely aggressive defense. General Regnier,
commanding general of the combat command, here employed a surprise
encircling maneuver which made it necessary for the battalion to be
prepared to fire east, north and south. The maneuver was entirely
successful and the enemy was driven into his Siegfried Line defenses.

The Combat Command was then assigned the mission of protecting the Duchy
of Luxembourg and of making a show of strength along a broad front, with
the 47th in direct support, the 400th and 987th having been previously
relieved of their reinforcing roles. This mission occupied the remainder
of the month of September during which the Batteries moved out of
bivouac areas to support daily tank infantry patrols.

Highlights of this operational period: Battery "A" on September 13 In
the vicinity of Berbourg, fired the first round of the organic
divisional artillery Into Germany.

Although the patrol on September 20 met no opposition and requested no
fires, Battery "B" had a busy afternoon after Lt. Brett, piloted by Lt.
Chacon in one of the Cubs, discovered a locomotive with six cars
steaming down a railroad just across the Luxembourg-German border,
headed for the basepoint. It was a matter of minutes until the train was
destroyed and with the assistance of two batteries of the 229th Field
Artillery Battalion (28th Infantry Division), the bridge under which the
engineer had driven the locomotive for cover was severely damaged. This
is believed to be the first instance on record of a battery of light
artillery destroying a railroad train.

Part of the German navy, consisting of a skiff loaded with enemy
personnel, was destroyed on September 26 by Battery "A" when the boat
received a direct hit.

In general, missions fired by the 47th during this period resulted in
the killing and dispersal of enemy working parties preparing the
Siegfried Line defenses, destruction of several tanks, neutralization of
many machine gun pillboxes and conveying to the enemy the idea that that
particular sector was not a "quiet" one.

On the 2nd of October, billeting parties of the battalion were alerted
for movement to a new area and left the same day at 0730. Not far from
the battalion position at Consthum, Luxembourg, the column of billeting
parties was taken under fire by enemy mortars and artillery. Lt. Peter
J. Austin was seriously wounded and his driver Tec 4 John F. Rohme, was
instantly killed.

Throughout the remainder of the month of October, the battalion moved to
Belgium, to Holland and back to Belgium as the Division was part of a
mobile reserve held In readiness to repel possible enemy counterattacks
as the Allied Forces began building up the offensive to the Roer River.

                    INTO GERMANY

The battalion's first entry into Germany occurred at approximately 1360
near Rotgen, Germany, on November 2, where it went into firing positions
to support a contemplated assault by CC "A" upon the towns of Strauch,
Simmerath and Kesterneck. That afternoon at 1630 the battalion suffered
the heaviest casualties it suffered in a single day. A flight of eleven
P-38 planes circled the CP buildings and then bombed and strafed the
area. The first three planes dropped two five-hundred pound bombs each,
the first bomb hitting five yards from the assistant S-3's halftrack.
Capt. E. D. Clark, Tec 6 A. G. Baker, Tec 6 Holscher, Tec 3 Nixon, Pfc.
Leonard all were instantly killed. M Sgt Cate died of wounds the same
day in a nearby hospital. Prompt action by a nearby anti-aircraft unit
which fired recognition flares caused the remainder of the planes to
pull out and leave the area.

The contemplated operation was cancelled and the remainder of the month
of November saw the battalion engaged in firing interdiction, harassing,
and some observed missions on the Siegfried Line defenses.

                    THE HELL OF HURTGEN

The battalion's mission was changed on November 29 to direct support of
CC "A" which was attached to the 4th Infantry Division to assist in the
final clearing of the Hurtgen Forest, and to force the enemy to the east
side of the Roer River. This mission was to prove to be the most
nerve-wracking and costly, from the personnel viewpoint, of all missions
in which the 47th participated. In the initial attack of CC "A" on
November 30, Lt. Ryan, reconnaissance officer of Battery "B" was killed
and both of his enlisted assistants wounded.

Accounts previously published of the gloomy, forbidding atmosphere of
the dense pine forest are generally agreed to be understatements.
Reports of the density and persistence of enemy artillery and mortar
fire were not exaggerated. To add to these factors when the battalion
moved into position and for several days thereafter, many enemy dead
were still in the area. The Germans were extremely aggressive and had
received orders to hold at any cost, an order which they did their
utmost to fulfill. Supplied with abundant artillery of all calibers, the
Boche held commanding ground so that our ground OP's were at a decided
disadvantage. Artillery rounds landed in and near the battery positions
almost continuously during the night and frequently during daylight
hours. The narrow roads through steeply-banked defiles in the mountains
leading to the battalion position were frequently under accurate enemy
interdiction fire.

The battalion mission was to support the attack of the 46th Armored
Infantry Battalion, and to reinforce the fires of the 4th Infantry
Division Artillery, who were supporting the attack of their infantry on
our left flank. We were assigned to the VII Corps for operations only.

The fiercest action of the three weeks in the Hurtgen Forest began at
0716 on December 2 when the enemy launched a series of counterattacks
against our supported unit. Intense artillery and mortar fire raked our
troops; the infantry were fanatical and aggressive. Our forward
observers and air OP's fired a total of 2,000 rounds between 0715 and
1500, when the attack was finally liquidated. At one critical time
during the action, the 47th laid down heavy defensive barrages in order
that wounded could be evacuated as the enemy paid no respect to Geneva
Convention Flags and arm bands prominently displayed by our Medics.

During this action, Lt. Boyle, battalion forward observer, was killed
while adjusting on a target and his observation sergeant wounded. Lt.
Egan and Tec 4 Manion, upon being relieved by another forward observer
section that evening, were evacuated for combat exhaustion. By the
evening of that day, however, the 46th Armored Infantry attained the
commanding ground that was their objective and held. That night they
were relieved by an infantry unit of the 4th Division, and the 47th's
mission was to reinforce the 4th's artillery fires.

The next day, the air OP adjusted the battalion's enormous enemy
artillery pieces. With the assistance of the heavier artillery of the
4th Division, and of VII Corps, these missions resulted in the
destruction of four enemy batteries with their ammunition and the
neutralization of three others. That afternoon, 20 enemy fighter planes
attacked the battalion position, but due to the intense and accurate AA
fire delivered by Battery "D" of the 387th AAA, and our own 50 caliber
weapons, the attack was dispersed with no damage done. Four planes
officially were credited the 387th, with Battery "B" of the 47th getting
an "assist" on one. From then on, enemy air was active, dropping several
bombs in the battalion area without causing damage or casualties.

On December 14, CC "A" and CC "B" attacked abreast, with the FO's from
the 47th assigned to CC "A's" assault troops. Good progress was made,
with the FO's firing many missions on targets of opportunity. A
counterattack launched that evening against the supported troops was
broken up and repelled by our artillery fire. The next day the attack
continued to make progress and by that evening, the enemy had been
driven across the Roer River, although he continued to send patrols over
to infiltrate our lines. In that last attack, Lt. Stumbaugh, battalion
forward observer, was seriously wounded while adjusting artillery fire
and was evacuated after refusing medical treatment for nine hours until
other wounded men in the vicinity had been treated.

From then until the 23rd of December, when the battalion moved with CC
"A" to an assembly area, turning over the sector to the 83rd Infantry
Division, operations consisted of interdiction, harassing and observed
fire missions across the Roer. On the 24th, the battalion arrived at an
assembly area near Baelen, Belgium, where the Division remained in army
group reserve prepared to move in any direction to help contain the
German forces struggling to break out of the famous Ardennes bulge.
Firing positions were selected in several different areas in the event
we were called upon to help repel a breakthrough. During this period (24
December to 27 January) our air was active over the area, and several
planes were brought down by Battery "A," 387th AAA which had been
reassigned to the battalion near the close of the Hurtgen operations.

                THE PERFECT ATTACK

Our next mission was direct support of CC "A" which had been attached to
the 78th Infantry Division. The doughboy division was to seize the town
of Eicherscheid, straighten our lines from there south and make contact
with the Ninth Infantry Division further south. The battalion moved to
positions east of Rotgen to support the attack. On January 30th, the
attack was launched and progressed according to plan so that by
nightfall of the same day, despite waist-deep snow, all objectives had
been achieved with very light casualties. During the attack, which was
later termed a "perfect example of tank-infantry attack tactics," the
47th was credited with destroying four emplaced 88's and one
self-propelled 88. These and other missions cost a total of only 2,000
rounds of 105 ammunition and several hundred rounds of 75, 76, and 90mm.
ammunition expended by "C" Company of the 34th Tank Battalion and the
1st Platoon of "A" Company of the 628th TD Battalion, both of which
units reinforced our fires during the operation.

                ON THE ROER

After a few days stay at Raeren, Belgium where the entire battalion was
billeted in buildings for the first since leaving England, the battalion
proceeded to the vicinity of Heerlen, Holland, arriving there on
February 7th. There a rear echelon was established consisting of all
personnel and vehicles except those needed in the operation of the
firing batteries. On February 8th, the 47th reverted to Division
Artillery control and the firing batteries and battalion fire direction
center moved Into positions near Welz, Germany, with the mission of
reinforcing the fires of the 102nd Infantry Division Artillery.

The positions were only 1,600 yards from the Roer River, across which
waited an enemy plentifully supplied with artillery, mortars, and
screaming-meemies, and who apparently had a large part of the remainder
of the Luftwaffe at his beck and call. These extremely forward positions
were necessitated by the tremendous Ninth Army build-up which took up
large areas of the available real estate. Coupled with the constant
activity of enemy artillery, mortars and aircraft, that factor forced
the battalion to adopt the unusual setup. These forward positions were
constantly shelled and enemy air attacks were daily occurances during
daylight and at night. The battalion, however, quickly dug itself in,
complete with overhead cover and for the first time since Hurtgen
, personnel slept underground. Vehicles in the firing batteries
were widely dispersed and camouflaged, measures which proved their
inestimable worth when a V-2 bomb landed directly in "B" Battery's area
without causing any casualties or damage, except extra wear and tear on
nervous systems. On February 11, incoming mail was received in "B"
Battery's position, wounding one of our men, and killing one man and
wounding two others of Battery "A," 387th AAA. The battery was moved to
its alternate position where the V-2 bomb landed two days later.
Incoming mail on February 12, killed Pvt. Dzierzowski, Battery "A," and
wounded two others. The fact that the battalion remained in those
positions from February 8th to the 23rd without firing a round in
retaliation added materially to the physical and mental strain of the

One of the high points in the history of the 47th began at 0245,
February 23, when the battalion joined in with the artillery of the XIII
Corps to fire the preparation for the Ninth Army's crossing of the Roer.
At that time the Army's preparation fire was termed the "greatest
artillery concentration ever fired." The battalion fired continuously
for almost three hours. Our guns were silent once or twice for periods
of eight minutes during the three hour preparation. During the rest of
the time, the fire was virtually continuous. It was a fact that one
could read a newspaper by the flashes of the Corps and Army artillery
during those three hours.

A unique plan of firing and repeating concentrations was employed
whereby a concentration would be fired, then the battalion would move on
to another in a different sector, and then return to the first
concentration. This was to punish Jerry for his long standing habit of
leaving his cover when a concentration landed in his vicinity and moved
on. Subsequent progress across the river and into Germany bore out the
brilliant success of this novel plan of prepared fires.

Between 0245 and 0642, the 47th alone fired 2,200 rounds of ammunition,
an average of nearly 10 rounds leaving the battalion every minute for
237 minutes. In spite of this sustained high rate of fire, far in excess
of the maximum allowed by the "book," every mission was fulfilled and
completed on time. Never in the history of the 47th had the gun crews
worked more efficiently and effectively, an achievement that is
heightened by the fact that all of this firing was done during hours of

                MASSING THE FIRES

The rear echelon joined the rest of the battalion on February 25, and on
the 26th, the 47th moved out to join CC "A". The combat command had been
given the mission of cutting communications around the city of
Munchen-Gladbach and securing the west bank of the Rhine River. The "big
picture" called for an advance east, then north to Viersen and then east
to the Rhine, Throughout this rapid and complicated advance, close
coordination within division artillery made available at all times
several battalions of artillery ready to support the action. The extent
of this powerful artillery support was to be seen in this attack of CC
"A" north from Hardt on March 1. At that time there were available three
battalions of light artillery, one of medium, and in addition, several
more battalions of mediums and heavies of the XIII Corps. In this
particular engagement, however, only the normal amount of artillery was
called upon as the weight and surprise tactics of the armored attacks
caught the Boche completely off base and what little resistance he could
offer was quickly crushed.

The same morning Lt. Chacon was piloting observer Lt. Lavelle In the
47th's Cub observation plane adjusting fire on enemy personnel. At about
0935, four FW 190's came in at tree top level, attacking the Cub, a type
of plane all German soldiers particularly hate because their presence
almost invariably means that artillery fire is forthcoming. The 190's
flew at a lower level than the Cub and then suddenly went into a steep
climb, firing all their weapons. It was not until the last stages of the
attack that the pilot and observer became aware of their predicament. In
spite of several hits on the light plane, Lt. Chacon, with the attacking
planes still in the immediate vicinity and a veritable storm of AA fire
coming up from the ground, managed to make a forced landing inside our
own lines. Both officers had been wounded during the attack, but the
superior flying skill of Lt. Chacon and the calm courage of both
officers enabled them to escape with their lives.

                SPEARHEADING AGAIN

The very nature of the swift armored advance through a disorganized
enemy, necessitated considerable mopping up operations. Upon occupation
of firing positions west of Krefeld, for example, a total of 29
prisoners was flushed out in the battalion area and our reinforcing
unit, the 695th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, accounted for nearly
as many. The fact that our accompanying infantry usually was unable to
keep up with us together with the enemy's fear of the American
"panzers," causing them to seek hiding places wherever possible, made
this phase of occupying positions quite a problem.

It was from this position at 1153 on March 3, that Battery "B" fired the
first round from the organic division artillery across the Rhine.

Moving north to St. Hubert, where the 47th reverted to Division
Artillery control, the battalion passed through Vluyn where we
discovered a large military warehouse which was turned over to higher
authority. Continuing the northward move, the battalion went into
position near Repellen, approximately 3,000 yards west of the Rhine,
where we engaged in delivering harassing and interdiction fires across
the river. Allied troops to the north of us were at that time engaged In
liquidating the pocket on the west bank near Wesel.

Enemy air activity continued to be frequent and heavy. Many attacks were
repelled with considerable damage to the enemy by our attached AA unit,
Battery "A" of the 387th AAA.

The adage that the "artillery never rests" at this time arose once more
to haunt us. The Fifth Armored Division, less the artillery, moved back
southwest into an assembly area while the 47th on March 12th moved to
the vicinity of Strump on the west bank of the Rhine opposite
Dusseldorf. There we supported the 36th and 44th Cavalry squadrons who
were charged with the mission of screening that sector and sending
patrols across the river to obtain information of the enemy. The day
after we arrived in the new position, Battery "A" of the 387th AAA
achieved the distinction of being one of the few units to shoot down a
German ME 262, an extremely fast jet-propelled job.

Despite the reverses the enemy were suffering in other sectors, opposite
us he showed plenty of fight and offered determined opposition to the
cavalry patrols which crossed the river almost nightly. Much of the AA
defenses of the cities of Dulsberg and Dusseldorf had been converted to
augment the self-propelled and fixed guns which the Boche were using
against us. Every day and night rounds landed somewhere in the battalion
area, but with unbelievable luck, no damage and only two minor
casualties resulted.
Shell reports were turned in dally from various
sectors within the area and these together with the reports of a sound
and flash battalion, and flash-bang reports from the OP's, provided us
with many profitable targets. Self-propelled guns rolled into position
at night firing twenty or more rounds as rapidly as possible proved to
be one of the most difficult problems encountered. Simultaneous
flash-bang readings from two or more OP's soon offered an effective
solution, however. It was in this position that General Popoff, a
Russian 152mm. gun captured from the Germans with a stock of ammunition,
was attached to the battalion for rations and work. Despite the fact
that no one knew exactly how the gun worked or which powder charges to
use (and there was a small matter of 20 mils free play in the sight),
the gun was fired with satisfactory results on targets across the river.

                ACROSS THE RHINE

At the end of March, as the Ninth Army, destined to repeat its
spectacularly successful crossing of the Roer, assaulted the Rhine
defenses, the Fifth Armored Division joined the build-up and crossed the
Rhine at Wesel. At this time, the 47th was assigned the mission of
reinforcing the fires of the 71st Armored Field Artillery Battalion,
which was in direct support of CC "B." After a dash of some 80 miles,
which brought us near the important city of Munster, CC "B" moved out in
two columns northeast toward Hannover on an exploiting mission far in
advance of the infantry divisions.

There followed a period when the advance was pushed to the utmost during
daylight hours. Against bewildered and disorganized enemy groups that
offered little resistance in their panicky efforts to escape the
American "panzers," the division progressed rapidly until we reached
Minden, where major river-crossing operations were necessary before we
could proceed. The score of captured and destroyed enemy equipment at
this point was huge. Prisoners became such a burden that only the most
important were given the routine handling. Hundreds upon hundreds of
ordinary prisoners were sent back down the route of advance without
guards until they came to a POW cage or the advancing infantry which
were far behind.

During the preparation for the next advance, the artillery under
Division control, supported the Weser River crossing of the 102nd
Infantry Division. After initial stiff resistance, the doughboy division
broke out of the bridgehead and the advance to the northeast got

                TOWARD HANNOVER

Again the 47th reverted to it's normal mission of direct support of CC
"A" with the 71st reinforcing our fires, and we began moving south to
cross the Weser at a point many miles east of the infantry crossing. The
objective of this typically armored maneuver was to threaten the
defenses of the city of Hannover and to cut its communications to the
south and southeast. After an advance of 75 miles in 15 hours, the
battalion reached firing positions at 0300, April 10, ten miles
southeast of Hannover near Osselee.

According to the information from the G-2, there were many enemy AA
positions in our vicinity protecting the approaches to Hannover. The
correctness of this information soon was apparent when a strong patrol
from the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion which had moved to the north to
test the enemy's defenses, ran into a hornet's nest of 88 and 75 high
velocity fire
from these AA guns converted to ground use. Our observers
with the patrol requested fire which was immediately delivered and good
effect obtained.

Due to the swampy character of the terrain, the battalion had been
forced to occupy crowded positions along a main highway that offered no
cover or concealment against enemy fire. No sooner had the first mission
been reported on the way, than the enemy responded with fire from his
88's. A ladder of 88 fire walked down the road along which the battalion
was deployed, pinning battalion headquarters and fire direction center
to the ground temporarily. To make matters infinitely worse, the
incoming mail arrived just at chow time. No casualties resulted however,
and operations were resumed, but the battalion was still confronted with
two problems: how to lay down fire to permit the disengagement of the
infantry patrol, and at the same time silence the enemy guns which were
doing their best to prevent us from accomplishing our primary mission.

With the immediate and valiant assistance of Lt. Col. Burton, commander
of the 46th Armored Infantry and the skillful use of the G-2 map
intelligence on the part of our forward observers, the battalion
delivered a volume of accurate fire which not only permitted the
disengagement of the 46th's patrol, but silenced the enemy guns that had
so seriously disrupted our noon meal. The 75mm assault guns of the 46th
materially aided the battalion in accomplishing this mission. An advance
of some 40 miles was then made to a position north of Braunschweig

                THE S-4's RAT

For some time rumors had been persistent throughout the battalion that
the S-4 was fattening a special purple rat for the final rat race. As
Soon as the advance began again, the S-4 delivered said lavender-hued
rat to the battalion commander, and the race was on. Our last advance
had netted the Combat Command the crossing of the canal network north of
Braunschweig and our leading element held a bridge over the important
Weser-Elbe canal.

During this advance and on succeeding days, we were daily flattered by
the persistent attention of the Luftwaffe which resulted in no damage to
anyone except the Luftwaffe. As our armored spearhead raced through
German rear areas, cutting vital communications and far ahead of the
main body of American troops, it was apparent that we were sufficiently
important for the enemy to risk what was left of his airforce. In
addition, the division overran several air fields, forcing enemy pilots
to take off for safer sectors and upon several occasions Luftwaffe
pilots attempted to return to their home field only to find them in the
rear of our lines. During this period our attached AA (Battery "A,"
387th AAA), many times crashed their half tracks through fences to get
off the road in order to fire on enemy planes strafing or observing the
column. It was an unusual day when the ack-ack failed to bring down at
least one plane.

As the advance continued (April 11 and 12), the available artillery,
consisting of the 47th, 71st and the 557th's self-propelled 155mm guns,
under division control, furnished 24 hour support for the rapidly
progressing armored infantrymen and tankers. Through Koltze, Calbe and
Bismarck toward the Elbe raced the armored columns. It was rumored on
good authority that the leading elements posted signs reading: "Road
surface cleared of Germans" for the guidance of following troops. In
several instances our experiences substantiated the rumor.

                AT THE ELBE

The Combat Command at noon on April 12, entered Tagermunde, the western
approach to the only intact highway bridge over the Elbe River in the
XIII Corps sector.
To prevent enemy troops from using the undamaged
bridge as an escape exit and then blowing it, heavy concentrations of
artillery fire were placed upon it. Armored infantrymen and tanks
battled into the town in a determined effort to secure the bridge. Early
in the engagement, however, it was discovered that special officer
candidate troops from Potsdam had been sent into the town to stiffen the
garrison of several hundred Wehrmacht troops in a last ditch effort to
prevent our crossing the Elbe. In spite of this fierce resistance, our
armored doughs and tankers bored relentlessly into the heart of the
city, finally convincing the commander of the garrison that his position
was untenable. Under white flags a surrender party negotiated with our
troops and the artillery was ordered to cease firing. The garrison
commander, however, had no control over the officer candidate troops and
in the course of the discussions they killed him. At the same time our
air OP reported that troops were using the bridge to escape across the
river in violation of the "stay in place" agreement.

The attack on the town was immediately renewed with greater intensity.
Our troops soon were approaching the bridge and the final mop-up was
underway when the retreating Boche demolished the bridge. The events
prior to the demolition of the bridge were but one indication of the
importance the enemy attached to the Tangermunde bridge. In the space of
three hours that afternoon, our attached AA shot down one JU 88 bomber,
four fighter planes (ME 109's and FW 190's) as well as a Heinkel 175

Brig. Gen. Regnier now directed a new assault upon a railroad bridge
across the Elbe in the vicinity of Arneburg, a few miles north of
Tangermunde. The 47th, and 71st moved to support the attack and no
sooner had the battalion registered than the air OP reported evidence
that the enemy was prepared to defend this bridge just as fiercely as he
had the Tangermunde structure. By this time the enemy was fully aware of
the threat and moved many more artillery pieces into position on the
east bank to assist his hard-pressed infantry. CC "A" launched an attack
which quickly carried our forces to the river, but again we were
disappointed when the enemy's demolitions converted the bridge into
useless junk. During the night of April 12, division artillery fired
many harassing fires on the river towns, paying particular attention to
Tangermunde. That same day the battalion captured 42 prisoners,
including a civilian technician of the German ministry of communications
who surrendered a recently developed Infra-red ray device for sighting
guns at night.

                A FORTIFIED HOSPITAL

The mission of the Combat Command was now to clear enemy resistance west
of the Elbe which required that the strongpolnt. of the town of Arneburg
be taken. In support of the attack, preparation fire was laid down in
and around the town as it was evident that the Boche intended to offer
strong defense. On instructions from our forward observers with the
leading elements, particular care was exercised to keep our fires clear
of a plainly marked hospital in the town. As the armored infantry and
tanks fought their way into Arneburg on April 13, they passed the
hospital and started to mop up the town. Suddenly withering high
velocity fire struck them from the vicinity of the undamaged hospital.
It was then discovered that the SS troops in charge of the defense of
the town had set up their main forces around the hospital.

This, of course called for immediate and drastic reversal of our
previous policy. It was not long until a devastating volume of artillery
fire liquidated the defenders and made possible the capture and
destruction of four 128mm AAguns mounted on railroad flatcars that had
constituted the backbone of the enemy's defense. It was then learned
that the medical officer in command of the hospital had protested so
strongly to the SS troops against their treacherous act that he had been
unmercifully beaten by those chosen ones of the superrace.

Toward dusk of the same day (April 13) a flight of 15 ME 109's and 190's
were spotted flying low over the battalion position, headed toward a
captured air field in our rear. Immediately all of the 60 caliber
machine guns in the battalion and the attached AA opened up, dispersing
the formation and knocking down one plane. The action lasted 30 minutes
with only one pilot showing any desire or ability to bore through the
screen of fire to strafe the area. No damage and no casualties were
caused, but the formation was effectively split and the Luftwaffe's
mission of bombing the captured field rendered abortive.

The next day, April 14, the 47th reverted to division control and moved
to an assembly area. From there the 47th, together with the other two
artillery battalions, moved up on the west bank of the Elbe opposite
Sandau as a part of the build-up of the XIII Corps, Ninth Army, for a
contemplated river crossing. Plans were changed, however, and the 47th
reverted to CC "A" control. After an all night march of some 70 miles
during the night of April 17 and 18, the battalion went into position in
the vicinity of Knesebecke in support of CC "A's" mission of cutting off
a large enemy force in our rear areas.

That afternoon the battalion again reverted to Division Artillery
control and was assigned the mission of reinforcing the fire of the 71st
Armored Field Artillery battalion. The battalion went into position near
Hanum the same day, and began to execute what was to become one of the
outstanding events in the battalions history.

                No MAN'S LAND

The successful completion of the British Second Army's plan and that of
the American Ninth Army, had created a pie-shaped wedge west of the Elbe
that had not been entered or cleared by Allied troops. German
intelligence quickly discovered this fact, and launched an attack
through this area on an exploiting mission designed to harass our supply
lines and eventually escape to a "redoubt" area in the Harz Mountains.
At that time, since the easternmost junction point of the British and
American armies was some fifty miles west of the Elbe river, any enemy
attack southward or eastward would find important supply lines and
installations practically undefended.

At Knesebecke. we had received word that no enemy had been found in the
large patch of woods that had been the objective of CC "A's" previous
move. It was then suspected that the enemy had managed to slip out of
the trap. Then the battalion received orders to meet a guide from
Division Artillery at Meimke in an attempt to find and neutralize enemy
infiltrations. Subsequently reports were received that enemy columns
definitely were in that area and hasty attempts were made to recall the
reconnaissance parties that had been sent out earlier. Lt. Wickstrom,
battalion forward observer with full knowledge of the situation,
volunteered to and successfully completed a trip in a peep to Meimke.
Due to his efforts, the reconnaissance parties safely rejoined the

The battalion then moved on April 18 to the vicinity of the small town
of Hanum where we took up our mission of reinforcing the fires of the
71st F. A. who were supporting CC "B." Throughout the remainder of that
day, frequent indications were received of hostile armored columns in
the vicinity, indicating that our positions, to put it mildly, were not
all that was to be desired. Reported activity was in large wooded areas
to the north and east of our positions which placed the enemy between us
and our tanks and infantry. That night security guards were doubled and
grenade booby traps were placed.

As soon as it became dark and the enemy could move without fear of the
air force, outposts began reporting considerable movement of enemy
forces in the woods. These reports were translated into fire missions
throughout the night, resulting In the expenditure of 1,000 rounds.
Early the next morning, April 19, air observers reported much enemy
activity in the same woods, and several missions were fired.

Led by a captured American halftrack, a column of vehicles attempting to
escape from the artillery fire and apparently unaware of our presence,
headed out of the woods and directly toward us. In response to a call
from a 90mm TD outpost on the edge of town, an M-7 from Battery "C" was
moved forward for direct fire as the enemy column was then about two
thousand yards from the battalion CP. A light sedan, then leading the
column, was about 200 yards from the battalion headquarters when Lt.
Willis, battalion forward observer, liquidated it and its occupants
after a short and dangerous pursuit. The TD outpost knocked out the
American half track and another sedan while "C" Battery's M-7 razed a
barn that was being used for cover by the enemy troops attempting to
escape from their vehicles.


That convinced the enemy that he had run into more than he cared to
handle and the remainder of the vehicles headed back into the woods,
later to become casualties in the amazing destruction of the Division
Van Clausewltz that continued throughout the day.

By this time CC "B," fully aware of the situation, launched an attack
west from Meimke to eliminate the German forces between themselves and
the artillery. Soon after the attack began, the headquarters of the 71st
F. A. was attacked by hostile direct fire weapons. The 47th immediately
placed fire on these guns, sometimes dropping rounds within 200 yards of
the 71st's CP. The struggle now had become one of the most spectacular
in our history and the finishing touches were added when the P-47's
arrived in response to our requests.

For sometime the air corps had been complaining about the lack of
targets, but on that day, ideal weather, absence of enemy flak, and
intelligence reports sent them by the ground forces engaging the enemy
provided a field day for the "glamor boys," From early morning until
dark fighter-bombers let the Division Van Clausewltz have the works,
including rockets. The display of bombing, strafing and rocket firing
was one for the books.

At the same time, our Cubs patrolled as closely as they dared to the
zooming, chattering, P-47's and their reports enabled the artillery to
assist greatly in destroying the remnants of the hostile division. That
same evening, eight enemy medical vehicles, comprising a section of a
field hospital complete with equipment, surrendered to the 47th after
Capt. Thacker, battalion Intelligence officer, had arranged the
capitulation terms.

The German medics told us that the entire staff of the Division Von
Clausewltz was in the woods about two kilometers north of our positions
and that they wished to surrender, but were prevented from doing so by
their Commanding General. The general, who soon abandoned his division
and took off in a sedan, apparently was the only one who thought his
forces could stand another night of unremitting artillery lire.

                ENEMY BRASS TURNS IN

That evening, however, as our heavy interdiction fire plans for the
night were getting underway, four enemy officers approached our CP and
stated that they wished to surrender the remainder of the forces in the
woods. They reported that their Commander had left them with
instructions to surrender if the situation became hopeless. Capt Thacker
and his S-2 section quickly arranged the capitulation terms and in a
short time the battalion accepted as prisoners 12 officers end 63
enlisted men, making our total for the day well over a hundred. The
interrogation team from division obtained valuable information from the
Division staff and evacuated them for further questioning.

The next day, April 20, as we supported CC "B's" troops in mopping up
the woods and nearby towns, the extent of the damage inflicted upon the
enemy division was fully revealed. Artillery fire and the
fighter-bombers destroyed almost 70 vehicles of all types including one
Tiger tank. Tours of the scene of wholesale destruction by members of
the gun crews of the firing batteries provided the solid satisfaction of
seeing for themselves what they had done to an aggressive enemy force.

                CLOSE-IN WORK

Late that same afternoon we rejoined Combat Command "A" to participate
in the Division's mission of clearing the enemy from the area west of
the Elbe. That night from a position north of Ruhrdorf, together with
the 557th F. A. (self.propelled 155 guns), we drew up our preparation
fires for the attack. At 0330 the next morning our reconnaissance
elements requested fire on enemy vehicles and aggressively attacking
infantry. Until dawn these requests kept coming in to us, each mission
being closer to our own positions until finally the outposts and a
married platoon (to whose position they had withdrawn) were forced to
pull back. By this time the action was only 1,500 yards from the
battalion position. At about this same time, "B" and "C" Batteries
reported a column of infantry moving into a woods about one-half mile to
their right flank. This was of course reported to CC "A" and higher
headquarters,and the following infantry dealt with this force.

After a sharp clash with the enemy immediately to our front, our armored
infantry and tankers proceeded. CC "A" now employed three task forces,
each one consisting of a married company and our zone of advance was
thoroughly swept. This manner of using the Combat Command raised
complicated problems for the supporting artillery. The necessity for
close coordination of fires with CC "R" on our right flank placed a
premium on perfect communications and instant response to requests for
fire. The problem was solved by having in position at all times two
batteries of the mediums (557th) and one battery of the lights or two
batteries of lights and one battery of mediums. This solution permitted
us to stay well forward at all times, gave us time to select better
positions, to keep better communications with our forward observers and
to reduce the congestion on the roads which by this time had become a
problem in itself. The four organic Cubs were used effectively, firing
either unit as the situation required.

Our rapid advance caught the enemy still trying to evacuate across the
river at Hitzacker while a pocket of resistance formed at the ferry
site, protecting the eastward flight of hostile troops. Our forward
observers placed fire on the site and the pocket was liquidated. The
aerial observers then took over to fire on targets across the river.

In one instance, Lt. Appleton, the aerial observer, acted somewhat in
the capacity of executive officer of a German 150 battery that was
firing on Lt. WIllis' supported unit. Lt. Willis from his ground OP was
unable to spot the offending hostile gun, but Lt. Appleton from his
upstairs vantage point quickly picked up the gun flashes and while he
adjusted our fires on the target reported to Lt. Willis when the German
guns fired so that our people had sufficient time to take cover before
the incoming mail arrived. Between reporting the German rounds "on the
way," Lt. Appleton speedily adjusted the 155's of the 557th on the
German battery and permanently silenced it.

On April 26, the battalion moved back to the Elbe again in the vicinity
of Kapern, charged with the mission of reinforcing the fires of the XIII
Corps artillery. In this position, the battalion fired its last rounds
in combat in the registration conducted on the 26th.

                MASS SURRENDER

While in this position about 2,000 yards from the river, the battalion
was treated to the rare sight of wholesale surrender of groups of the
supperrace by company, battalion and even by division as the Boche
rushed pell mell to get out of the war before the Russians caught up
with them. These were most fruitful days that contributed mightily to
the battalion's store of Heinie pistols and binoculars. On May 3, the
battalion moved to the town of Suderwittingen and was given the mission
of working with the military government in setting up control of PW's
displaced persons, and civilians. Road blocks were established in the
area and the daily bag ran into large numbers.

At this location we received word on May 8th that hostilities had ceased
on the western front.

We ended the war still with our record of having fired every mission
requested of us and of never firing into our own lines despite the
hectic confusion of the many "fluid" situations in which we had

                THE END

              IN MEMORIAM
Captain Ernest D. Clark, Jr. November 2, 1944
1st. Lt. Thomas K. Brown August 21, 1944
1st. Lt. John R. Ryan November 30, 1944
Lt. Robert W. Boyle December 2, 1944
M Sgt. Roy D. Cate November 3, 1944
Sgt John G. Fountouklis August 21, 1944
Tec 5 Arthur G. Baker November 2, 1944
Pfc  Clyde G. Leonard November 2, 1944
Pvt Raymond Dzierzawski  February 12, 1945
Tec 5 James J. Nixon, Jr. November 2, 1944
Tec 4 John F. Rohme October 2, 1944
Tec 5 Wm. J. Holscher, Jr. November 2, 1944
Pvt Elbert P. Alvis March 24, 1944
Pvt Rudolph W. Garrison August 8, 1944

                THE SCOREBOARD
The following is a compilation from official records of prisoners
captured and actually processed by the 47th and the materiel destroyed.
These figures do not include the many hundreds of prisoners not
processed and sent to the rear without guard; nor do they Include
materiel damaged - total destruction only is here scored. The many guns,
vehicles and other equipment which our fires forced the enemy to abandon
undamaged are not included in the below figures.

Half tracks............................  3
General Purpose Vehicles....20
Passenger Vehicles...............10
20mm. Guns..........................18
75mm. Guns........................... 2
88mm. Guns .........................29
120mm. Guns......................... 2
150mm. Guns......................... 3
Barges..................................... 8
Railroadtrain.......................... 1
Boat......................................... 1
Miscellaneous......................... 5

Lt. Col. John B. Rosenzweig Commanding Officer
Maj. James J. Wilkie Bn. Executive
Capt. Ned A. Thacker S-2
Capt. Howard R. Clark, Jr. Adjutant
1st. Lt. William F. Proncavage Pilot
Maj. Richard P. Barnard S-3
Capt. Tyrus R. Ambron Liaison Officer
Capt. Edwin I. Parson Surgeon
2nd Lt. James G. Dean Pilot

Sgt Anthony A. Catanzaro
Sgt Arthur W. Sturtevant
Tec 4 John W. Duckett
Tec 4 Robert G. Zimbeck
Cpl Warren G. Gadwah
Tec 5 Robert N. Borg
Tec 5 Clarence M. Whitmire
Tec 5 Ralph McKinney
Pfc Donald J. Duhr
Pfc Albert D. McCallon
Pvt Frank L. Cravens
Pvt Lyle E. Baker
Pvt Lloyd J. Dudley
Pvt Richard P. Macaboy

S/Sgt. Joseph R. Hrezo
Tec 3 Joseph L. Lenart
Tec 4 John S. Romon
Cpl Anthony B. O'Donell
Tec 5 Homer L. Bandy
Tec 5 Adolph Kotulski
Tec 5 Bernard Thau
Pfc Samuel Baranik
Pfc Robert W. McKay
Pvt Howard Levitt
Pvt Stanley M. Sobelman

Capt Hermon F. Graebner, C. O. and Asst. S-3
1st. Lt. Robert E. Behen Comm. O.
1st. Lt. Frank J. Roth  Maintenance Officer
1st. Lt. Joseph P. Brett Recon. and Survey O.
1st. Lt. Peter J. Austin Recon. and Survey O.
2nd. Lt. Lawson D. Franklin Forward Observer
Lt. Vernon C. Wickstrom Forward Observer
Lt. Lenard H. Willis Forward Observer

1st/Sgt John R. McKay
T/Sgt James A. Bostian
T/Sgt Roger B. Brooks
T/Sgt George H. Martin
T/Sgt Hoover S. Martin
T/Sgt Robert G. Stanley
S/Sgt Theophile Begnaud, Jr.
S/Sgt Leland G. Bishop
S/Sgt Hoyle D. High, Jr.
S/Sgt Thomas Scafidi
S/Sgt Edmund P. Solinski
Tec 3 John R. McMahon
Sgt Harry G. Evans
Sgt Frank H. Fox
Sgt Hoyt M. Isom
Sgt Ruben J. Joffrion

Tec 4 Grady Coffey
Tec 4 Ralph A. Gonzales
Tec 4 John A. Kublna
Tec 4 Wayne Manion
Tec 4 Buford L. McLain
Tec 4 Russell E. Miller
Tec 4 Edward C. Montanaro
Tec 4 Lloyd C. Nelson
Tec 4 Ernest C. Pavlicek
Tec 4 Luther T. Salazar
Tec 4 Gene Talarico
Tec 4 Wallace N. Willoughby

Cpl William M. Autry
Cpl Harland B. Danz
Cpl James A. Ferraro
Cpl Wayne H. George
Cpl Alvin L. Howe
Cpl David W. Johnson
Cpl William K. Long
Cpl John I. Saimi
Cpl Fred L. Schaefer
Cpl Tom B. Wehunt

Tec 5 George A. Buck
Tec 5 Amos C. Cambron
Tec 5 Gerard N. Folse
Tec 5 William H. Foster
Tec 5 Wade Massey
Tec 5 Joseph Parrino
Tec 5 John C. Peck
Tec 5 Dean H. Pelmann
Tec 5 Waldo P. Smith
Tec 5 Floyd D. Sours
Tec 5 Edmund M. Sullivan
Tec 5 Joseph S. Wojcik
Tec 5 Edward J. Wojtecki
Tec 5 Carl H. Woosley
Tec 5 L. E. Beauchamp

Pfc Anthony C. Cocola
Pfc Andrew B. Gilbride
Pfc Edward K. Kravitz
Pfc Gayle J. Luther
Pfc Andrew Pribish
Pfc William M. Reed
Pfc Nicholas A. Schmitt
Pfc Clement A. Swieczkowski
Pfc John W. Willard

Pvt Arnold D. Cherashore
Pvt Clarence A. Collette
Pvt Bartolo Colon
Pvt Grant B. Finnell
Pvt Lawrence R. Greer
Pvt John C. Henderson
Pvt Clarence R. Koch
Pvt William A. Linville
Pvt George Molner, Jr.
Pvt Willie W. Perrett
Pvt Leonard G. Sanders
Pvt Boyd Simmons
Pvt Verlin V. Swedberg

        BATTERY "A"

Capt. John E. Courier, Jr., Commanding Officer
1st. Lt. Herbert R. Alexander Executive Officer
1st. Lt. Michael J. Lavelle Bn. Air Obsr., Mtn. O.
1st. Lt. John E. Millett, Jr. Reconnaissance Officer
2nd. Lt. Ernest L. Robison, Jr. Mentenance Officer

1st/Sgt Harold Flene
S/Sgl Lewis Baer
S/Sgt George B. Noland
S/Sgt William T. Reeves
S/Sgt Ethridge E. Robison
S/Sgt Thomas W. Smith
S/Sgt Almer N. Stronach

Sgt Ogle Campbell
Sgt Mike E. Durichko, Jr.
Sgt John Gans
Sgt Laurie P. Holbrook
Sgt James R. Loden
Sgt Lester J. O'Malley

Tec 4 Norman W. Castello
Tec 4 James A. Evans
Tec 4 Clifton Gordon
Tec 4 Douglas A. Hall
Tec 4 Charles B. Lovorn
Tec 4 Sanford Moore
Tec 4 Horace L. Thomas

Cpl Clyde L. Albritton
Cpl Clint Avery
Cpl Ernest B. Clark
Cpt William R. Duncan
Cpl Joseph G. Nelms
Cpl Henry W. Moffett, Jr.
Cpl Owen E. Oglesby
Cpl Hable Reed
Cpl Harold H. Straker
Cpl Thomas B. Weatherford

Tec 5 Lee R. Brittain
Tec 5 Edward T. Carruth
Tec 5 Marco J. Favaloro
Tec 5 Owen H. Kangas
Tec 5 Raymond J. Lovelady
Tec 5 Lawrence F. Mauch
Tec 5 Wayland H. Norris
Tec 5 Clyde T. Phipps
Tec 5 Vernon C. Ray
Tec 5 Robert Rubenstein
Tec 5 J. C. Sauls
Tec 5 John Seman
Tec 5 Edward J. Welte
Tec 5 Joseph B. Windley
Tec 5 Dalbert C. LaFleur
Tec 5 Arthur O. Louden

Pfc Maynard Abeioff
Pfc Fines O. Adams
Pfc Gordon G. Bahr
Pfc Wayne R. Benton
Pfc Frank J. Bernas, Jr.
Pfc Edward F. Boytim
Pfc John E. Brucke
Pfc Theodore J. Buczkowski
Pfc Thomas B. Christensen
Pfc Roma Dalpe
Pfc Karl H. Feldt
Pfc Tom B. Hale
Pfc Bulord W. Harden
Pfc Erwin M. Hein
Pfc William J. Isom
Pfc Cleo C. Layne
Pfc Lawrence M. Lee
Pfc Richard D. Lewis
Pfc John Lillie
Pfc Lacy Locklear
Pfc Robert E. McBride
Pfc Ernest McCord
Pfc Bonam W. Parker
Pfc Jessie C. Roberts
Pfc Verlon D. Smith
Pfc William D. Spell
Pfc John D. Thomas
Pfc Ernesto Villanueva
Pfc Leighton J. Witzke
Pfc Vincent G. Yurkunas

Pvt Adrian I. Abshire
Pvt James E. Aldredge
Pvt Grady L. Beard
Pvt John C. Brown
Pvt John D. Buchholz
Pvt Harold B. Burks
Pvt William E. Doyle
Pvt Whitney J. Duplantis
Pvt William J. Gantt
Pvt March B. Garland
Pvt Paul Guillory
Pvt Reggie Hoffpauir
Pvt John D. Jackson
Pvt John T. Knotts
Pvt August A. Kroesch
Pvt Edward F. Longo
Pvt Melvin E. Mason
Pvt Roy G. McComic
Pvt Anthony Pasternak
Pvt Norman J. Reppen
Pvt Carrel V. Scott
Pvt Raymond M. Whidden
Pvt Lawrence L. Williams
Pvt Milton M. Willis
Pvt George C. Wood
Pvt Jay Wood

        BATTERY "B"
Capt. William B. Dawson. Commanding Officer
1st. Lt. William J. Foran  Executive Officer
1st. Lt. Wilbert H. Allen Maintenance Officer
1st. Lt. James L. Gallagher Reconnaissance Officer

1st Sgt. James A. Wright
S/Sgt John L. Cummings
S/Sgt John B. Catlin
S/Sgt Robert S. Hawthorne, Jr.
S/Sgt William E. Robinson

Sgt James C. Blass
Sgt Lorree Elliott
Sgt Wiley H. Heard, Jr.
Sgt Joe W. Igou
Sgt James F. O'Nore
Sgt Jewel E. Simpson
Sgt Carson S. Slear

Tec 4 James A. Edwards
Tec 4 Earl L. Hanna
Tec 4 Robert G. Hildinger
Tec 4 Leonard L. King
Tec 4 John C. McPherson
Tec 4 Duane B. Nelson
Tec 4 Chester O. Skinner
Tec 4 Larue P. Wasson

Cpl Orville L. Alsup
Cpl Warren F. Boyett
Cpl Wilson Cain
Cpl Guslave W. Christoph
Cpl Thomas O. Crocker
Cpl Lonzie I. Gillis
Cpl Harry J. Lewis
Cpl Joe M. Marshall
Cpl Eli Murphy
Cpl Philip Paularena
Cpl Joseph B. Plucinski

Tec 5 Daniel F. Bishop
Tec 5 Harley E. Briscoe
Tec 5 Gaston A. Clark
Tec 5 Lee M. Creel
Tec 5 William M. Gantz
Tec 5 Walter A. Hammack
Tec 5 Vernon Hendrickson
Tec 5 Harold A. Henry
Tec 5 Claude Hitt
Tec 5 Carroll F. Klockenteger
Tec 5 John J. Knight
Tec 5 Harry F. Lutz, Jr.
Tec 5 Ralph Martin
Tec 5 Warren J. McCabe
Tec 5 Anthony Render
Tec 5 James L. Scott
Tec 5 Teddy W. Sikorski
Tec 5 Merle R. Tanner

Pfc Curtis A. Blackwell
Pfc Samuel W. Corn
Pfc Norwood D. Covil
Pfc Allen R. Drake
Pfc Harry H. Fleming
Pfc Lloyd K. Fogle
Pfc Ernest W. Freeman
Pfc Thomas J. Garrett
Pfc Roex A. Grider
Pfc Verl Griggs
Pfc James L. Hunt
Pfc Cecil F. Inns
Pfc Shirley Joyner
Pfc Dwight L. M. Kirkman
Pfc Charles Licatao
Pfc Thomas J. Patterson
Pfc John D. Pinkerton
Pfc Enick Prudhomme
Pfc Joseph Roy
Pfc Clyde Smith
Pfc Holly T. Smith
Pfc William W. Snell
Pfc Jessie Snow
Pfc James B. Thompkins
Pfc Frank F. Valdez
Pfc William F. Wellner
Pfc Ponie B. Woodham
Pfc Farst B. Wynne
Pfc Jerry Yasgoor
Pfc Edward W. Zaker

Pvt Berval L. Ashworth
Pvt James H. Ballew
Pvt Alex Coffee
Pvt Lonnie Cook
Pvt Earl Davis
Pvt Leslie H. Davis
Pvt Wesley H. Downey
Pvt Billy A. Fairell
Pvt Lelon O. Grissom
Pvt Steve P. Holowach
Pvt James R. Jameson
Pvt Clare B. Lamos
Pvt Ishmel Ott
Pvt Savino R. Reyes
Pvt Peter G. Salerno
Pvt Earl C. Shellenbarger, Jr.
Pvt Francis Snyder
Pvt Joseph S. Tannenbaum
Pvt John O. Thomas
Pvt Julius F. Winkler
Pvt Frank W. Winn

        BATTERY "C"
Capt. Harry A. Brehmer, Commanding Officer
1st. Lt. Millard E. Anderson Executive Officer
1st. Lt. Harry G. Rawlins DS., Div. Hq.
1st. Lt. Rodney L. Bucklin Reconnaissance Officer
1st. Lt. Robert L. Appleton Air Obsr. and R. O.
2nd Lt. James M. Morris  Maintenance Officer

1st/Sgt John A. Wynne
S/Sgt Athel G. Britton
S/Sgt Melvin L. Cabe
S/Sgt Donald A. Jones
S/Sgt Joseph C. Ruczynski
S/Sgt Woodley H. Smith

Sgt Clen V. Blum
Sgt Carl E. Cannon
Sgt John P. Gold
Sgt William A. Studdard
Sgt M. J. Taylor
Sgt Walter Vollmuth

Tec 4 Gaylord E. Banner
Tec 4 Everett E. Berry
Tec 4 Mark T. Berry
Tec 4 Dewey A. Davis
Tec 4 Seth A. Greer, Jr.
Tec 4 James O. Grissom
Tec 4 James H. Merritt
Tec 4 Dewey L. Wilson

Cpl Harold K. Bolding
Cpl Tyrus R. Caldwell
Cpl Ralph W. Coleman
Cpl Willie E. Creekmore
Cpl Thomas P. Crisco
Cpl Ralph Eckard
Cpl Washington I. Keener
Cpl Audrie K. Lee
Cpl Oliver M. Lien
Cpl Exell Nixon
Cpl Earl C. Von Neida
Cpl John P. Wells

Tec 5 Arlin E. Bandy
Tec 5 Carl C. Baugher
Tec 5 John R. Beaty
Tec 5 John R. Blackwelder
Tec 5 Doyle M. Garcia
Tec 5 Clifton Hattaway
Tec 5 Carl E. Hogeland
Tec 5 Richard L. Johnson
Tec 5 Leonard D. Mizelle
Tec 5 David J. Perry
Tec 5 William J. Phillips
Tec 5 George P. Proctor, Jr.
Tec 5 Maurice O. Skalet
Tec 5 Robert T. Ward
Tec 5 Roy F. Woosley
Tec 5 Jack Alexander

Pfc John W. Aide
Pfc William M. Arnette
Pfc Euzebe Babineaux
Pfc Donald E. Bailey
Pfc Glenn Bentley
Pfc Lawrence Neal
Pfc Ernest Bevans
Pfc Edward M. Brown
Pfc John W. Burger, Jr.
Pfc William G. Carlin
Pfc Alexander B. Chizuk
Pfc Herbert O. Elmore
Pfc Melvin L. Francis
Pfc Orville E. Hegel
Pfc Howard E. Howell
Pfc James M. Kennedy
Pfc William C. Lemons
Pfc Harry W. Lyles
Pfc Archie L. Mathews
Pfc Howard D. Mathews
Pfc Hubert L. McCown
Pfc Lewis C. Montague
Pfc Emilio Pena, Jr.
Pfc Harold R. Putman
Pfc Jack Phillips
Pfc Harvey F. Reaves
Pfc Orise Rider
Pfc Robert H. Shelton
Pfc John W. Shy
Pfc Bruce B. Simmons
Pfc Jack Taylor
Pfc Charles Vaccar
Pfc Ernest E. Vargo
Pfc Eddie A. Breaux
Pfc William H. Walter
Pfc Clarence T. Waters
Pfc Paul J. Whitt
Pfc Charles E. Wilson
Pfc Johnny J. Yates
Pfc John Yeznick. Jr.

Pvt Jesse F. Carpenter
Pvt John R. Colligan
Pvt Guy J. D'Aurora
Pvt Joseph E. Fabina
Pvt Peter A. Fazekas
Pvt Jack C. Martin
Pvt Roy D. Price
Pvt Claud S. Rutland
Pvt Coy D. Sowell
Pvt Rupert A. Spencer
Pvt Juan Webber
Pvt Ferrell C. Wilson
Pvt Mack Wright

1st Lt. John Box, Commanding Officer, S--4
Capt. Gene D. Goldiron C.O., 6 Aug 44 - 9 May 45
1st. Lt. Bernard L. Bobkin Ammunition Officer
CWO William D. Branch Personnel Officer
2nd. Lt. Wood A. Reynolds Asst. S-4
WOJG Morgan R. Meadows Bn. Maintenance O.

1st/Sgt Cecil Pittman
Mr/Sgt Albert R. Herron, Jr.

T/Sgt Henry J. Fitzgerald
T/Sgt Willis C. Proudfoot
T/Sgt Edmund J. Zaleski

S/Sgt Raymond L. Baker
S/Sgt Stephen H. Dafoe
S/Sgt Art F. Fox
S/Sgt Louis Pall
S/Sgt Joseph F. Rzasa
S/Sgt Jim T. McPhall

Sgt Donald T. Cameron
Sgt Claude L. Hendrix
Sgt Willard R. Lamb
Sgt Riley R. Spears

Tec 4 Alvin Brossette
Tec 4 J. B. Dunn
Tec 4 Robert L. Gill
Tec 4 Coleman J. Green
Tec 4 Jerome F. Hausmann
Tec 4 Floyd P. Horsley
Tec 4 Donald B. Jackson
Tec 4 Kenneth R. Kemp
Tec 4 Sylvester R. Lowenthal
Tec 4 Jake H. Pooler
Tec 4 Eugene Rexrode
Tec 4 Waldo P. Sank
Tec 4 Eugene A. Whipple
Tec 4 Jerry Woods

Cpl Albert A. Cohen
Cpl Ivan H. Lyons

Tec 5 Robert Aguilar
Tec 5 Norman E. Arlt
Tec 5 Lester S. Churchill
Tec 5 Luther C. Graves
Tec 5 Arthur R. Hargus
Tec 5 William C. Hemiller, Jr.
Tec 5 Mansfield Johnson
Tec 5 Fred L. King
Tec 5 Charles D. Lucas
Tec 5 Dean H. McConahay
Tec 5 William M. Mohler
Tec 5 Boleslaw Rup
Tec 5 William P. Thornhill
Tec 5 Howard R. Winkle
Tec 5 Donald W. Roth

Pfc Andrew C. Allen
Pfc Curtis L. Ayers
Pfc Russell M. Buss
Pfc Floyd R. Chisenhall
Pfc Jesse P. Garcia
Pfc Stanley Gietek
Pfc Leo Greenstein
Pfc Raymond E. Henricks
Pfc Elwood Hill
Pfc Arthur L. Knapp
Pfc Edward McKinney
Pfc Bruno Miazzo
Pfc Seymour Miller
Pfc Genaro P. Romero
Pfc Deames B. Sandlln
Pfc Alfonso Vasquez
Pfc Charles Vyborny
Pfc Adolph W. Wilde
Pfc Reuben R. Watts

Pvt Jack C. Bailey
Pvt Keith A. King
Pvt Norman A. Hebert
Pvt Paul R. Hummel
Pvt Erich Karger
Pvt Jesse D. Knipp
Pvt Morris C. Lucus
Pvt Burneft Plasier
Pvt Louie Poole
Pvt Michael D. Sweet
Pvt John M. Toolis
Pvt Floyd H. Tyner
Pvt Edward E. Vlcek
Pvt Charlene L. Wray