BATTLE OF HURTGEN FOREST
Written by: Ernie Herr His Web Page.
Provided by Joe Thompson
The Worst of the Worst: The Battle for the Hurtgen Forest
There are stories that may need a half century or more to age before being told, giving
memories and bitterness a chance to fade and giving those involved, time to have passed into
history. The story of the battle for the Hurtgen Forest is one of those stories. Please read it,
not for enjoyment, but as an honor to those whose sufferings were never properly recognized and
whose remarkable accomplishments never celebrated. And, like the stories of Europe's holocaust,
please read it so that these memories might lessen the chances of it happening again.
The Hurtgen Forest, covering roughly fifty square miles just south of ancient city of Aachen
along the German-Belgium border, was described by those who were there, as a "weird and wild"
place. Here "the near one hundred feet tall dark pine trees and dense tree-tops gave the place,
even in daytime , a somber appearance which was apt to cast gloom upon sensitive people." It was
like a green cave, always dripping water, the firs interlocked their lower limbs so that
everyone had to stoop, all the time. The forest floor, in almost perpetual darkness, was devoid
of underbrush. Add to this gloom, a mixture of sleet, snow, rain, cold, fog and almost knee
deep mud. This was to be setting for the most tragic battle of World War II.
After the war, German General Rolf van Gersdorff commented, "I have engaged in the long
campaigns in Russia as well as other fronts and I believe the fighting in the Hurtgen was the
heaviest I have ever witnessed." Still, the Germans were delighted that the Americans wanted to
throw their weight into an attack against dug-in troops in a forest where the American
preponderance of artillery and command of the air would be of little value. Also, delighting
the Germans was that the Hurtgen Forest was of little military value and, if lost to the
Americans, could be flooded since the Germans held flood control dams above the level of the
forest. It was a battle that the Germans really couldn't lose.
Both German and American troops fighting here had to share these deplorable conditions: exposed
to incessant enemy fire, fighting daily without relief, receiving little support from their own
artillery, drenched in frequent rain, and without the possibility of changing clothes. Forsaken
as they were they had no choice but to hold out and die in hopeless resignation. Oddly enough,
one-half of the Americans who fought here had German - American ancestry which meant that three
quarters of all the combatants in the Hurtgen Forest were either German or of German origin.
When American troops, who had fought in Sicily, Italy, Normandy and Holland, finally took the forest,
they said they had never seen anything that could compare to this for the amount of shattered
military equipment scattered throughout and the countless American dead. They referred to this
as death valley. What the British staff officer said after inspecting the Somme battlefield in
France during the First World War could have very well applied here. He cried out, "My God: Did
we really send men to fight in this?" Those that fought the battle from the American side were
mostly from the high school classes of 1942, 1943 and 1944.
They were to pick up the battle and move on after the classes of 1940 and 1941 had driven this
far to the German border but now were too few in numbers to press on. These mostly still
teenagers included championship high school football teams, class presidents, those that had
sung in the spring concerts, those that were in the class plays, the wizards of the chemistry
classes, rich kids, bright kids. There were sergeants with college degrees along with privates
from Yale and Harvard. America was throwing her finest young men at the Germans. These youths
had come from all sections of the country and from every major ethnic group except the African -
American and the Japanese - American. Due to an Army policy in force at the time, these two
groups did not participate in this battle.
The training these young men had gone through at State-side posts such as Fort Benning was
rigorous physically but severely short on the tactical and leadership challenges that the
junior officers would have to meet. British General Horrocks (one of the few generals, if not
the only general to do so) made a surprise front line visit to the 84th division and described
these young men as "an impressive product of American training methods which turned out
division after division complete, fully equipped. The divisions were composed of splendid, very
brave, tough young men. "But he thought it was too much to ask of green divisions to penetrate
strong defense lines, then stand up to counter attacks from first-class German divisions. And
he was disturbed by the failure of American division and corps commanders and their staffs to
ever visit the front lines. He was greatly concerned to find that the men were not even getting
hot meals brought up from the rear, in contrast to the forward divisions in the British line.
He reported that not even battalion commanders were going to the front. Senior officers and
staff didn't know what they were ordering their rifle companies to do. They did their work from
maps and over radios and telephones. And unlike the company and platoon leaders, who had to be
replaced every few weeks at best, or every few days at worst, the staff officers took few
casualties, so the same men stayed at the same job, doing it badly.
When Capt. John O'Grady of Ninth Army's Historical Section visited the Forest in late November,
he sent back a memorandum to Ninth Army: "On 23rd November the battalion was attacking a
superior German force entrenched on an excellent position. The only thing that higher
headquarters contributed to the debacle was pressure, and God only knows where the pressure
started, perhaps Corps or perhaps Army. It had the effect of ordering men to die needlessly."
O'Grady was furious: "Tactics and maneuver on battalion or regiment scale were conspicuous by
their absence. It never seemed to occur to anyone that the plan might be wrong; but rather the
indictment was placed on the small unit commanders and the men who were doing the fighting. The
companies went into battle against the formidable Siegfried Line with hand grenades and rifle
bullets against pillboxes. The 84th Division walked into the most touted defensive line in
modern warfare without so much as the benefit of a briefing by combat officers." These were the
magnificent kids of the American high school classes of 1942, 43 and 44 and while over 50,000
German soldiers were executed for desertion during this time period, only one American soldier
was executed for the same offense, remarkably demonstrating the patriotism and devotion to duty
of this group.
That this patriotism and devotion was so abused and never recognized even to this day, should
be cause for a heavy heart. If there were ever a group of Americans for which a tear should be
shed, this would be the group.
The battle began on September 19, 1944 when the 3rd Armored Division and the 9th Infantry
Division moved into the forest. The lieutenants and captains quickly learned that control of
formations larger than platoons was nearly impossible. Troops more that a few feet apart
couldn't see each other. There were no clearings, only narrow firebreaks and trails. Maps were
almost useless. When the Germans, secure in their bunkers, saw the Gis coming forward, they
called down pre sighted artillery fire, using shells with fuses designed to explode on contact
with the treetops. When men dove to the ground for cover, as they had been trained to do, they
exposed themselves to a rain of hot metal and fragmented wood. They learned that the only way
to survive a shelling in the Hurtgen was to hug a tree. This way they exposed only their steel
helmets to steel and fragments coming straight down from the top of the trees.
With air support and artillery almost useless, the GIs were committed to a fight of mud and
mines, carried out by infantry skirmish lines plunging ever deeper into the forest, with
machine guns and light mortars their only support. For the GIs, it was a calamity . In the
September action, the 9th and 2nd Armored Divisions lost up to 80 percent of their front-line
troops, and gained almost nothing. "Call it off" is what the GIs wanted to tell the generals,
but the generals shook their heads and said, "Attack." On November 2, the 28th Infantry
Division took up the fight. The 28th was the Pennsylvania National Guard and was called the
"Keystone Division" referring to their red keystone shoulder patch. So many of the Pennsylvania
National Guard were to fall here that the Germans decided their name should be changed from the
"Keystone Division" to the "Bloody Bucket Division," since the keystone looked somewhat like a
bucket. When the 28th tried to move forward, it was like walking into hell. From their bunkers,
the Germans sent forth a hail of machine-gun and rifle fire and mortars. The GIs were caught in
thick minefields. Their attack stalled. For two weeks, the 28th kept attacking, as ordered.
On November 5, division sent down orders to move tanks down a road called the Kall trail. But,
as usual, no staff officer had gone forward to assess the situation in person, and in fact the
"trail" was solid mud blocked by felled trees and disabled tanks. The attack led only to more
heavy loss of life. The 28th's lieutenants kept leading. By November 13, all the officers in
the rifle companies had been killed or wounded. Most of them were within a year of their
twentieth birthday. Overall in the Hurtgen, the 28th suffered 6,184 combat casualties, plus 738
cases of trench foot and 620 battle fatigue cases. Those figures meant that virtually every
front-line soldier was a casualty. The 28th Division had essentially been wiped out.
However, Generals Bradley and Hodges remained determined to take the Hurtgen Forest. Having
eliminated the 28th Division, they put in the 4th Infantry Division. This division had led the
way onto Utah Beach on June 6th, and had gone through a score of battles since. Not many D-Day
veterans were still with the division -- most were dead or badly wounded. Here in the Hurtgen
Forest, the 4th Infantry Division would be asked to pour out its lifeblood again. Between
November 7 and December 3, the 4th Division lost over 7000 men, or about ten per company per
day. "Replacements flowed in to compensate for the losses but the Hurtgen's voracious appetite
for casualties was greater than the army's ability to provide new troops." Lieutenant Wilson
recorded his company's losses at 167 percent for enlisted men. "We had started with a full
company of about 162 men and had lost about 287." Sgt. Mack Morris was there with the 4th and
reported: "Hurtgen had its fire-breaks, only wide enough to allow two jeeps to pass, and they
were mined and interdicted by machine-gun fire. There was a mine every eight paces for three
miles. Hurtgen's roads were blocked. The Germans cut roadblocks from trees. They cut them down
so they interlocked as they fell. Then they mined and booby trapped them. Finally they
registered their artillery on them, and the mortars, and at the sound of men clearing them,
they opened fire." After the 4th Division was expended, the First Army put its 8th Infantry
into the attack. On November 27, it closed in on the town of Hurtgen, the original objective of
the offensive when it began in mid-September. Orders were given to Lt. Paul Boesch, Company G,
121st Infantry, to take the town. At dawn on November 28, Boesch put one of his lieutenants on
the left side of the road leading to the town while he took to the other side. When he gave the
signal, Company G charged. "It was sheer pandemonium," he recalled. Once out of that damned
forest, the men went mad with battle lust.
Boesch described it as "a wild, terrible, awe-inspiring thing. We dashed, struggled from one
building to another shooting, bayoneting, clubbing. Hand grenades roared, fires cracked,
buildings to the left and right burned with acrid smoke. Dust, smoke, and powder filled our
lungs, making us cough, spit. Automatic weapons chattered while heavier throats of mortars and
artillery disgorged deafening explosions. The wounded and dead -- men in the uniforms of both
sides -- lay in grotesque positions at every turn. Lt. Paul Boesch was wounded later that night
by a German shell and was sent to a hospital in the States. He would be one of the few left to
report the battle. "Dead men tell no tales." The 8th Division did not get far beyond the town
before it was used up. A staff officer from regiment visited the front and reported, "The men
of this battalion are physically exhausted. The spirit and will to fight are there; the ability
to continue is gone. These men have been fighting without sleep for four days and last night
had to lie unprotected from the weather in an open field. They are shivering with cold, and
their hands are so numb that they have to help one another on with their equipment. I firmly
believe that every man up here should be evacuated through medical channels." Many had trench
foot, all had colds or worse, plus diarrhea.
It was time to send in another division. The 2nd Ranger Battalion was brought in. It had fought
on Omaha Beach on D-Day and fought costly battles in Normandy and although it had taken 100
percent casualties, the core of the force that Lt. Col. James E. Rudder had led ashore on June 6
was still there. The battalion was assigned to the 28th Division in the Hurtgen and moved into
the line. It immediately took casualties from mines and artillery, then the men sat in foxholes
and took a pounding. On December 6, orders were given to attack Hill 400 (named after its
height in meters). It was on the eastern edge of the forest and therefore the ultimate objective
of the campaign.
The hills provided excellent observation as the highest point in an area of mixed farmland and
forest around it. The Germans had utilized it so effectively that neither GIs nor vehicles
moved during the day as the slightest movement around it would bring down 88's and mortars.
The First Army had thrown four divisions at Hill 400 but after every attempt, the Germans were
able to hold it. More blood would be needed.
Ranger companies A, B, C, D, E and F moved to the base of the hill under cover of darkness
ready with fixed bayonets to charge at first light. Sgt. Bill Petty, who had distinguished
himself on D-Day, recalled that "tension was building up to the explosion point." At first
light, he shouted, "Let's go get the bastards!," and firing from the hip, he led the Rangers as
they charged. Sgt. Bud Potratz remembered hollering "Hi ho, Silver!" It was worse than D-Day
but the Rangers had caught the Germans by surprise and although the Germans were good that day,
they were not good enough! When Sgt. Petty reached the top of the hill, he "found a situation
of turmoil." With another Ranger named Anderson, he approached the main bunker and heard Germans
inside. They pushed open the door and tossed in two grenades. Just as they were ready to rush
in and spray the room with their BAR, a shell exploded a few feet away -- the Germans were
firing back on their own positions. The explosion blew Anderson into Petty's arms. Anderson was
dead, killed instantly by a big piece of shrapnel in his heart. Sgt. Petty had the unusual and
very sad experience of having another Ranger named Anderson (brother of the Anderson who had
just died in his arms) get hit by German fire and had him die in his arms within the hour. The
Germans were not going to give up the hill no matter what the cost. By 9:30, the first of five
counterattacks that day began. They used machine guns, burp guns, rifles, and three potato
masher grenades. Hand-to-hand fights developed on top of the hill often with bayonets.
German Field Marshal Model offered Iron Crosses and two weeks' leave to any of his men who
could retake the hill. The Germans threw in everything they had. On the American side, Ranger
Lt. Lomell remembered, "we were outnumbered ten to one. We had no protection, continuous tons of
shrapnel falling upon us, hundreds of rounds coming in." At one point, Lt. Lomell saw his
platoon sergeant, Ed Secor, "out of ammo and unarmed, seize two machine pistols from wounded
Germans and in desperation charged a large German patrol, firing and screaming at them. His few
remaining men rallied to the cause and together they drove the Germans back down the hill."
Lomell was a legend among the Rangers for what he did on D-Day, but in 1995 he commented, "June
6, 1944 was not my longest day. December 7th, 1944 was my longest and most miserable day on
earth during my past 75 years." As Ranger numbers dwindled and ammunition began to run out,
American artillery saved the day. During the night, ammo bearers got to the top of the hill and
brought down the wounded on litters. Lt. Lomell was among the wounded and hence lived to tell
the tale. The combined strength of the three companies left on top of the hill was five officers
and eighty-six men. Just after daylight, the Germans shelled the hill with such intensity that
one explosion would cover the sound of the next approaching shell. But when the Germans attacked
the hill with infantry, a combination of artillery and small arms fire of the rangers drove
them back. Late on December 8, an infantry regiment and tank destroyer battalion relieved the
surviving Rangers. The Rangers had suffered 90 percent casualties and once again would have to
be replenished with very few of the originals alive to be part of the new Ranger Battalion.
A week and two days later, the Germans retook the hill and not until February 1945 would the
Americans get it back. When the Americans took Hill 400 again, the campaign would come to a
close but since the Americans did not have the dams upstream, the Forest for which they had
paid such a high price would be worthless. The battle had lasted ninety days and involved nine
American Divisions and their supporting units. More than 24,000 Americans lost their lives and
there were another 9,000 casualties from trench foot, disease and combat exhaustion. So ended
the battle for the Hurtgen Forest.
How and why so many wonderful young people were sacrificed and for what purpose poses an
interesting question. It has been said that the battle for the Hurtgen Forest was based on a
plan that was grossly, even criminally stupid. There does not appear to be any arguments to the
contrary. The statement that, "The months-long battle of the Hurtgen Forest was a loser that
our top brass never seemed to want to talk about" seems to say it all. Who can be blamed?
Probably no one, or everyone who had anything to do with its planning. Headquarters personnel
from battalion on up to Corps and Army found themselves good billets and seldom strayed near
the front. Of course there were notable exceptions, but in general the American officers handing
down the orders to attack and assigning the objectives had no idea what it was like at the front.
Combat veterans said that only on the rarest of occasions was any officer above the rank of
captain or officer from the staff were ever seen.
The first step down the road to this disaster can be traced to the following order:
COMBAT UNITS ARE AUTHORIZED TO BASE DAILY REPLACEMENT REQUISITIONS ON ANTICIPATED LOSSES FORTY
EIGHT HOURS IN ADVANCE TO EXPEDITE DELIVERY OF REPLACEMENTS. TO AVOID BUILDING UP OVERSTRENGTH,
ESTIMATES SHOULD BE MADE WITH CARE. SIGNED EISENHOWER.
This order was based on the necessity of providing replacements for battle losses in time to
insure that the initiative would not be lost in battle situations where the enemy was on the
run but might recover if replacements were not quickly available. Unfortunately, the order
enabled inept staff officers to bring in replacements at such a fast pace that companies and
even divisions could take tremendous losses that only could be acceptable because of this
replacement policy. The officers making these decisions were never close enough to the front
lines to be in danger themselves so they were always around to continue to make more costly
At the Hurtgen Forest battle, it was Generals Bradley and General Hodges who were responsible
for these costly mistakes. They used this procedure but failed to put into place any checks to
determine if this policy could be causing excessive loss of troops. This was the weakness of
the plan and unfortunately, no one ever bothered to check it out. The blame for this catastrophe
was a failure of the generals at the highest levels. The officers from the level of captain
down to freshly commissioned lieutenants and enlisted men from sergeants down to the newest
recruits, performed and died with such courage that all Americans should be forever proud of
them. Taking the time to read this account and consider its implications might diminish the
possibility of this type of disaster happening again. Then again, maybe not.